The relation between morality and religion has often been discussed. However, it is not always recognized that the relation varies greatly according to the variety of religions. I shall here be concerned solely with Christian theism in its traditional form. I take the latter to signify, essentially, belief in a morally perfect Creator who exists in the threefold form of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and who, in the person of the Son, became man in Christ for our salvation. I (...) thus exclude from consideration all non-theistic accounts of God or the Absolute. Also I shall consider, not simply bare theism of the kind that Christians share with Jews and Muslims, but also the distinctively Christian form of theism that is generated by distinctively Christian revelation. Many otherwise sound descriptions of the relation between morality and theism are defective because they fail to consider the distinctively Christian contribution to the theistic concept of God and of his relation to the world. (shrink)

Many writers often generalise about mysticism without a sufficiently close analysis of texts. Consequently the generalisations are often invalid. My present aim is to analyse one text and, in the light of this analysis, to offer some observations concerning mysticism in general and Christian mysticism in particular.

Christianity affirms, with Judaism and Islam, that God is the omnipotent Creator of all things. But it diverges from them in also affirming that the Creator assumed a human nature in one figure of history, Jesus of Nazareth. Christ thus differs from other men in kind, not merely in degree; he is absolutely, not just relatively, unique. Admittedly many Christian theologians have held that the difference between Christ and other men is only one of degree. Yet the Church's traditional claim, (...) as expressed in the Chalcedonian Definition, is that Jesus was both creature and Creator, both fully man and fully God. (shrink)

In this chapter the explanatory value of four conceptions of human dignity to account for two seemingly contradictory intuitions is tested. One is that many people think poverty violates the humanity of poor people. The other intuition is that poor people often act with remarkable dignity despite their trying circumstances. First Immanuel Kant’s influential view on human dignity that claims it is grounded in humans’ capability to make moral judgments is examined. Next, Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the capability approach is (...) tested, which is hugely influential across many academic disciplines and in the world of economic development. Thereafter, two related, though distinctly different African theories of human dignity, as offered by Thaddeus Metz and Polycarp Ikuenobe are assessed. Both base their theories on the core capacity of humans to engage in harmonious relationships within communities. Last, it is investigated the theory that Avishai Margalit provides of honour and humiliation as concepts that illuminate the value and risks for humans’ possession of dignity. His theory is linked to aspects of the recognition theory of Axel Honneth. In the end, it is concluded that these theories either cannot fully, or adequately, explain the complex relationship between poverty and human dignity. (shrink)

A methodology of the human studies needs to settle the conflict between the two long-established truth-seeking approaches. To be scientific, like physics, promises system, precision, and practical applicability but ignores the significant peculiarity of the subject matter: People talk. Hermeneutics, the methodology of interpretation, confronts the difficulties of understanding what people mean, but is suspected of lacking rigor. However, the two approaches are not exclusive alternatives. Sharing common procedures, such as classification and deduction, they also supplement each other: Interpretation depends (...) on factual evidence and scientific objectivity depends on reliable communication. Successful research needs to combine scientific study of facts with methodical interpretation of meaning. (shrink)

The contemporary debate on justice is understandably dominated by theories and arguments addressing the problems of justice pertinent to nearly just societies, as virtually all the theorists participating in this debate live in such societies. They are obviously, and rightly so, first and foremost concerned with the philosophical problems of their own societies. Although almost all the contemporary theories of justice were formulated in the context of nearly just societies, why can we not apply them to the issues and problems (...) of radically unjust societies? The view that such a move is permissible and wise is at present no more than an unexamined assumption, an unargued view. Such an unargued view leads to the suspicion that a strong case may be made that radically unjust societies generate problems of social and political justice that should be considered in their own right. This does not imply that theories of justice developed in the context of, and aimed at, those issues current in nearly just societies should be disregarded or discarded. What is required are arguments to indicate to what extent the theoretical insights and wisdom contained in these theories can be utilized in a discussion of the social and political problems of radically unjust societies. I argue for the view that the contemporary debate on justice contains a major deficiency. In this article, I attempt to specify this major deficiency, namely that exclusive attention is given to the problems of nearly just societies while the problems of radically unjust societies are mostly ignored. The strategy will be to raise issues pertinent to radically unjust societies and note the extent to which clear and unambiguous solutions could be provided by participants in the contemporary debate on justice. (shrink)

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Summary. — The following theorem is proved.: If the statistical predictions of quantum theory are true in general and. if the macroscopic world is not radically different from what is observed, then what happens macroscopically in one space-time region must in some cases depend on variables that are controlled by experimenters in far-away, space-like-separated. regions. By what happens macroscopically in one space-time region is meant specifically the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a macroscopic event, such as the d.etection and recording of (...) a particle by some macroscopic device. By a variable controlled. by an experimenter in a certain space-time region is meant specifically the experimental setting in that region of some macroscopic device, in which this setting is controlled. by an experimenter acting within that region. The theorem pertains speci6cally to experimental situations in which there .are two far-apart, spacelike-separated. regions in each of which there is a device that can be set at either of two alternative settings by an experimenter acting within ' that region. There. is also a long sequence of experimental results (4.e. events) in each of the two regions. The theorem asserts that, for some such cases, it is mathematically impossible, within the manifold. (shrink)

The famous passage in which Plotinus declares that fine art, so far from simply reproducing nature, ‘goes back to the Reason-principles from which nature herself emanates,’ has hitherto been generally regarded as a tacit criticism of Plato's teaching, and as an original contribution to the philosophy of art involving a rupture with the entire previous tradition of Greek aesthetic theory. Yet Plotinus introduces it, not as if he were proclaiming a new gospel, but almost casually, as a subordinate link in (...) his discussion of Intelligible Beauty. And though his respect for Plato was not the half-superstitious reverence of the later Neoplatonists, he was at all times more zealous to walk in Plato's footsteps than to correct or criticize him, tacitly or otherwise. Moreover, can it be said with certainty that his doctrine is in itself opposed to Plato's? That question can be answered only by a detailed examination of Plato's theory of art—a task which I hope to accomplish elsewhere. In the present article, postponing all enquiry into the relation between these two aesthetic theories, I shall endeavour to show that the teaching of Plotinus was not a sudden innovation, but the natural and indeed inevitable outcome of preceding thought. (shrink)

Philosophic anthropology, Pursuing philosophy's traditional search for reflective self-Knowledge seeks to crystallize the ideas of man underpinning empirical research and moral ideals. Neither the claim that pure speculation can produce factual knowledge nor the contention that a higher synthesis of empirical findings can become philosophy is acceptable. Philosophic anthropology is, Therefore, Most usefully conceived as a critique which traces the necessary presuppositions of the study of man in its various forms of the more rules we apply.

v. 1. Cosmogenesis -- v. 2. Anthropogenesis -- v. 3. Occultism.